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What is the difference between readers’ experience of fictional and nonfictional 
narratives? How might the cognitive sciences be able to capture that difference? In 
order to work towards answers to these questions, this chapter focuses on the 
cognitive processes engaged in readers of fictional narratives. It brings together some 
recent literary theories of the imagination and fictionality, on the one hand, and views 
of perceptual experience presented within the enactive paradigm of cognitive science, 
on the other. What these approaches share is a view of the human imagination as a 
process that is both fundamental to our ability to negotiate our physical and social 
world, and complex and multi-layered enough to resist easy analysis. Fictionality 
studies and enactive cognition have also both presented valuable alternatives to some 
intuitive assumptions about the imagination, assumptions which have to a large extent 
been reproduced within the computational paradigm of cognitive science.  
Within computationally inflected neuroscience, the imagination has mainly 
been discussed in the context of visual perception, memory and future projection (e.g. 
the production of mental imagery on the basis of recollected details, or the mental 
replication of actions through the mirror neuron system; Denis, 2001). While many of 
these earlier studies understood the imagination specifically as a process of forming 
mental images, today’s research explores more widely the ways in which human 
beings imagine alternate realities—whether in everyday situations or as the audience 
of works of fiction.1 However, because the computational model of the mind follows 
centuries of tradition in assuming that human cognition is primarily rational, it 
presupposes that the fundamental operations of the imagination must also follow rules 
of logical information processing. While studies of the imagination in the humanities 
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might be quick to deny such an assumption, the computational drive inherited by 
many cognitive studies of literature leads, I suggest, to the neglect of those effects of 
fictionality that depend on contradictions between what is known and what is 
experienced. Cognitive literary studies are thus at risk of pushing the imagination to 
fit within a model which erases many of the capacities that actually make it 
interesting to a humanities scholar. Alan Richardson (2011, 2015), from his position 
as specialist in the Romantic period, points out how little attention the mainstream 
cognitive discussion has paid to those humanities debates that emphasise the 
irrational, emotional and experiential aspects of the phenomenon. The imagination as 
conceptualised within the cognitive sciences is “strangely attenuated—one might even 
say tamed”, Richardson suggests, because the computational perspective of the 
scientists aims to “render the imagination rule bound and quotidian” (Richardson, 
2011, p. 664–665; see also Danta & Groth, 2014, p. 7).  
But it should also be noted that the cognitive sciences, in moving away from 
the computational paradigm, are themselves becoming more interested in the wilder 
and weirder sides of the imagination, and in this chapter I would like to focus on the 
ways that the combination of the enactive paradigm within the cognitive sciences and 
the theories of fictionality within literary studies can help each other in forming a 
more nuanced view of the imagination for both fields of study. 
 
Fictionality in empirical studies of literature 
 
Taking up Richardson’s call for more complex views of the imagination in cognitive 
literary studies, I argue that approaching fiction as fiction is a central element in 
literary imagining. The underlying idea is that readers of fiction engage in a 
seemingly contradictory interplay of the immersive and the reflective aspects of 
fiction. Such a view, while amply theorised within literary studies, has been largely 
absent from the empirical studies on readers’ experiences of fiction. This is true, for 
example, of Green and Brock’s (2000, p. 704) much-referenced “Transportation 
Scale”, a questionnaire formulated for studying the depth of readers’ immersion in a 
fictional world.2 The scale measures aspects such as imagery, involvement, emotional 
effects and distance from reality, and respondents are asked to rate these effects on a 
scale of 0-60. However, some items on the questionnaire reveal the scholars’ 
assumption that involvement with narrative can only mean engagement with the 
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events and characters represented, not engagement with the artefact itself. Thus, even 
though questions 4 (“I was mentally involved in the narrative while reading it”) and 8 
(“I found myself thinking of ways the narrative could have turned out differently”) 
can be answered positively when readers’ involvement is with the level of storytelling 
rather than (or as well as) the events, the scale interprets all positive answers as 
counting towards the respondents being, in Green and Brock’s (2000, p. 701) terms, 
“‘transported’ into the world of the narrative and [becoming] involved with its 
protagonists”. Another example comes from one of the most publicised recent 
experiments concerning the effects of literature, David Comer Kidd’s and Emanuele 
Castano’s 2013 article in Science. Their results seem to show that literary fiction 
improves our understanding of other minds more than do either nonfiction or popular 
fiction. The argument is based on the statistical analysis of readers’ self-reports in five 
separate experiments, of which the first includes the fiction/nonfiction condition. In 
that study, however, the comparison is undermined by the fact that the authors 
deliberately chose nonfiction texts that “primarily focused on a nonhuman subject”, 
while the fictional texts included “at least two characters” (Kidd & Castano, 2013, 
supplementary material), as if the difference between the two modes consisted simply 
in the presence or absence of people to empathise with. With such a choice of 
material, the more active priming of interpersonal skills in readers of the fiction texts 
can hardly be a surprise, and the findings, such as they are, speak only to the effects 
of characterisation, not those of fiction or nonfiction.  
These studies, like most empirical work on fictionality, used self-report 
questionnaires. One of the few neurophysiological studies of the difference between 
fiction and nonfiction was conducted by Altmann et al. (2014) to examine how 
paratextual information shapes the reading process. Participants read dozens of c. 50-
word narratives arbitrarily labelled as either fiction or nonfiction, while their brains 
were scanned using fMRI. The main findings here indicate that the texts flagged as 
nonfiction engaged systems associated with the simulation physical actions, whereas 
with texts flagged as fictions the activation patterns were more like those associated 
with “mind-wandering” and “relational inferences” (Altmann et al., 2014, p. 26). 
Such results, creating a tenuous connection between fiction-reading and the open-
minded readiness of hypothetical thinking, are attractive (see also Richardson, 2011, 
pp. 685–687), and indicate that it is worthwhile to pay attention to relational as well 
as action-related cognition in the processing of narratives. However, since Altmann 
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and colleagues wanted to focus primarily on the intersubjective aspects of reading, the 
participants were also asked to fill out the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) 
devised by Mark H. Davis (1980). These results were then compared with the 
strengths of the activation patterns indicating mentalising—the act of imagining other 
minds. Altmann and colleagues are careful as to the extent of the conclusions they 
draw from these results, but the suggestion is that because brain patterns indicating 
mentalising are more strongly activated in individuals who self-report a strong 
identification with fictional characters in general, and because the same patterns of 
activation are more strongly manifest in reading fiction than nonfiction, fiction can be 
said to differ from nonfiction because it engages our interpersonal cognition more 
fully.  
While the fMRI results themselves are intriguing, I would like to draw 
attention to one detail in this study that is arguably problematic from the point of view 
of the literary view of the imagination. Altmann et al. (2014, p. 24) base the 
correlation between the fMRI results and the respondents’ general tendency to engage 
with characters on one of the four factors identified in the IRI—the “Fantasy Scale” 
(Davis 1980, table 3). This section focuses on reactions to fictional characters, and 
even though is designed for the measurement of empathetic skill rather than the 
reading of fiction more generally, in it empathetic identification is itself 
conceptualised in roughly similar ways as immersion or transport in literary studies, 
and equated with successful engagement with fiction. Thus, some Fantasy Scale items 
adopt the common shorthand of assuming that 'good' or 'interesting' stories or films 
are by definition those that promote an empathic identification, and positive answers 
to questions like "When I am reading an interesting story or novel, I imagine how I 
would feel if the events of the story were happening to me" (item 26) and "When I 
watch a good movie, I can very easily put myself in the place of a leading character" 
(item 23), are seen to indicate high tendency to empathise. However, also responses 
indicating whether or not participants tend to get "caught up in" or "involved in" a 
story (items 7 and 12) are judged the same way, revealing an underlying assumption 
that such generally engaged reactions to fictions also designate empathy towards 
fictional characters. Since no option is given for respondents to indicate that they may 
be caught up in a novel’s way of using language, in the intricacies of its narrative 
structures, or, indeed, in its fictionality, all responses to these questions end up 
counting towards an individual respondent’s tendency to empathise. Furthermore, 
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since the Fantasy Scale of the IRI does not correlate particularly strongly with the 
other three parts of this empathy measurement (Davis 1980, p. 14–15), the baseline 
against which Altmann and colleagues are measuring their participants’ fMRI scans is 
arguably problematic. 
What I suggest, therefore, is that we look critically at results from studies 
which start with the assumption that engagement with fiction functions only through 
empathic identification with fictional characters, or that such engagement requires a 
form of illusion or loss of a sense of the fictionality of the story. In the following I 
will argue that fiction is perceived through a double vision that is unlike the kind of 
“aesthetic illusion” (Wolf, 2013) that sets such awareness and engagement to work 
against each other. 
 
Enactive perception of fictions 
 
Despite the fact that many psychological and neurological studies of fictionality have 
suffered from the conceptual problems described above, the cognitive sciences can 
offer literary scholars valuable insights into how our general cognitive skills are 
activated not only by the environments or people represented in a text, but also by the 
fact of their fictionality. These insights are offered by the critique of the 
computational model that has appeared in the form of the ‘4E’ paradigm. This 
paradigm takes the mind to be embodied, embedded, enactive and extended (Menary, 
2009; Stewart, Gapenne & Di Paolo, 2010), and it presents a view of cognition that 
changes from a computer-like input-processing-output model to a system 
incorporating more complex—and more intractable—feedback between an embodied 
being and a dynamic environment. As such, the 4E approaches draw not only on 
neuropsychology but also on phenomenology—a combination that the computational 
paradigm has resisted (see e.g. Gallagher & Zahavi, 2007; Noë, 2004, 2012; 
Thompson 2007). 
My focus is on the consequences of enaction and embodiment for the 
imagining that readers undertake in experiencing fiction. Enactive cognition broadly 
takes thought to be “the exercise of skillful know-how in situated and embodied 
action”, in the sense that all our thinking—however abstract and introspective—is in 
constant feedback with “recurrent sensorimotor patterns of perception and action” 
(Thompson, 2007, p. 13). Consequently, an enactive understanding of literary reading 
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conceives it also as a skill-orientated interaction between a reader’s embodied mind 
and the literary object. Enactive cognition has already been shown to affect our 
understanding of fictionality in interesting ways, and new scholarship has presented 
analyses of embodied reactions to texts, including topics such as sensing fictional 
spaces (Caracciolo, 2011), experiencing movement and body boundaries (Esrock, 
2001; Kuzmičová, 2012), or identifying embodied feelings coded into the rhythms of 
narrative (Caracciolo, 2014). For example, in her examination of perceptual 
experiences of narrative, Emily Troscianko (2013) emphasises the difference between 
the enactive view of imagining and the “picture in the head” variety presented in older 
forms of cognitive neuropsychology: “I don’t have a mental image of the cat I’m 
imagining”, she writes, “but I perform the same kinds of exploratory behaviours as 
when I see one, with weaker forms of sensory feedback provided from memory” 
(Troscianko, 2013, p. 185). What is crucial in such literary scholarship is its 
interaction with the enactive paradigm to produce a view of the literary imagination as 
a set of complex processes that engage the mind-body with the fictional environment 
offered by the text.  
Troscianko (2013) has also drawn attention to the way in which our folk-
psychological assumptions about the imagination often lump together several 
experiential aspects. Her example is the way in which the concept of ‘vividness’, 
much used in questionnaire studies of literary imagination, actually conflates two 
aspects: actual visual detail and emotional intensity. The unacknowledged presence of 
this conceptual amalgam, Troscianko argues, results in flawed experimental data 
about the exact processes involved. In a similar fashion, I wish to unpack another 
conceptual conflation: that what is being encountered during reading is in some 
senses like a world, but is a fiction. I am particularly interested in the role of the 
clearly signalled fictionality of the literary work in the process, and in how readers’ 
minds are able to assume a perspective that is simultaneously aware of the fictionality 
of the events it follows and yet fully cognitively and emotionally engaged with them.  
For the purpose of unpicking this conflation, I draw on the theory of enactive 
perception as presented in Alva Noë’s Action in Perception (2004) and Varieties of 
Presence (2012). Perception, Noë argues, “is constituted not only by the perceiver’s 
mastery of patterns of sensorimotor dependence, but by the fact that the perceiver 
knows that his or her relation to the environment is mediated by such knowledge” 
(Noë, 2004, p. 65). According to this “full-blooded duality of perceptual experience”, 
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seeing, for example, a silver dollar from an angle includes an experience of the 
elliptical shape presented from that angle as well as the circularity we know the object 
to have, since our learned patterns of sensorimotor perception tell us that from an 
angle a circular object presents itself to us as elliptical (Noë, 2012, p. 52). Such 
experience includes not only how an object looks, but also how it is—two aspects of 
experience that arise from our knowledge of how objects look from various spatial 
positions we can have in relation to them.3 I suggest that the fictionality of a narrative 
could be seen as an analogy of our angled stance towards the silver dollar. The 
representation, by drawing on readers’ everyday cognitive patterns, creates a sense of 
the verisimilitude of the storyworld, while at the same time that effect is itself 
dependent on readers’ ability to negotiate narrative’s fictional mode of representation. 
In some sense, then, in perceiving fictions we perceive them as both elliptical 
(verisimilar) and circular (fictional). It should be noted that for Noë the “full-blooded 
duality” of perception implies that experiencing how things are and how they seem is 
possible without shifting attention. Consequently, the view of the perception of fiction 
presented here differs from the plot-oriented prediction and hesitation effects 
examined by Karin Kukkonen in her contribution to this volume, in that fictionality 
and the fictional world are not like Wittgenstein’s duck-rabbit—two aspects 
impossible to see at the same time—but instead like seeing either one because we see 
the lines of the famous drawing. That is, we see the lines as either a duck or a rabbit, 
but in both cases we see both the lines and the animal (see Noë, 2012, p. 21−22 and 
Polvinen, forthcoming). 
The full ramifications of this analogy should not be seen only in the context of 
specifically visual imagining, nor is this conceptualisation likely to support clear-cut 
ontological categories of fiction and nonfiction into which narratives could be divided 
(see also Polvinen, forthcoming). If applied to the entirety of our complex 
engagements with fictions, a theory of enactive perception of fictions as fictions 
demands much more work in terms of teasing out the various emphases in different 
texts. For this kind of work we can draw on literary scholarship which relies on ideas 
of praxis recognisable to those working within the enactive paradigm. For example, 
Joshua Landy’s volume How to Do Things with Fictions (2012) combines literary 
analysis, hermeneutics and the philosophy of narrative fiction, and argues that one of 
the major functions of fictionality is to train the mind in assuming particular mental 
states. “Rather than providing knowledge per se,” Landy writes, “whether 
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propositional knowledge, sensory knowledge, knowledge by acquaintance, or 
knowledge by revelation—what [fictions can] give is know-how; rather than 
transmitting beliefs, what they equip us with are skills; rather than teaching, what they 
do is train. They are not informative, that is, but formative” (Landy, 2012, p. 10). Of 
particular interest is the way Landy bases the power of these “formative” fictions on 
the fact that in order to do the training they do, they must generate in their readers a 
state of “conviction and distrust” in the enchantment being offered (Landy, 2012, p. 
76). In his analyses of texts that range from the Gospel of Mark to Mallarmé and 
Beckett, Landy thus lays open a form of writing that connects with its readers most 
acutely on a level of “lucid self-delusion” (Landy, 2012, p. 12). The combination of 
engagement with what seems to be the case, and awareness of the fact that we are 
being presented with an illusion, is a seemingly paradoxical mental state that is 
nevertheless required of us when experiencing such fictions. At the same time, the 
fictions themselves hone our skill in entering that state to an enduring and easy habit 
(see also Landy, 2015, p. 572).  
Landy’s “lucid self-delusion” follows a tradition running from Aristotle’s 
mimesis (see Halliwell, 2002) to Coleridge’s willing suspension of disbelief—of 
seeing fiction as something that calls not for a loss of a sense of reality, but for the 
maintenance of a dual attitude.4 It might be argued that these two aspects of 
engagement with fiction should be seen as distinct processes, one a low-level and 
intuitive perceptual process, the other a conscious and culturally organised process of 
interpretation (see e.g. Hutto & Myin, 2013, p. xviii). However, it is crucial to this 
view of fictionality to recognise that perceptual and interpretive processes are always 
intertwined in reading, and that there are qualities in fictions which are available to 
the audience only when they use specific fiction-related cognitive skills. Such is the 
argument made by Richard Walsh in Rhetoric of Fictionality (2007), where 
fictionality is presented as a communicative strategy built into works of fiction by 
authors, and recognised as such by readers. Fictionality is therefore a rhetorical mode 
that changes the way readers comprehend the thing being represented: “awareness of 
its artifice is innate in any response whatsoever to fiction as such” (Walsh, 2007, p. 
172). Thus losing sight of fictionality as a quality of the text would mean readers are 
no longer experiencing fiction but have, instead, slipped into a nonfictional mode of 
reading.   
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By combining these 4E cognitive and literary-theoretical perspectives, I 
suggest, we can understand the experience of fiction as a form of enactive perception 
where fictionality, instead of being a quality that fades to invisibility in order to be 
effective, is rather the perspective that makes perception and comprehension of fiction 
as fiction possible. Furthermore, our experience of fictionality need not to clash with 
our perception of and engagement with the fictional world, but is conjoined with it. 
The enactive actualising of the cognitive process presented by a fictional narrative 
should not be understood only as a re-enactment of a character’s experience (as the 
verisimilar content of the fictional representation), but must instead be seen to also 
involve the discourse patterning of the narrative—everything from individual 
linguistic details to its communicative status as a work of fiction.  
 
Fictionality and the products of magic: The Prestige 
 
In the space remaining, I will extend this theoretical discussion to the analysis of a 
novel which I believe cashes in on those imaginative processes which the enactive 
approach to fictionality brings to light. Christopher Priest’s The Prestige (1995) is a 
meditation on the 19th century and its tensions between spiritual and materialist 
sensibilities. This is a cultural moment that many other writers have approached 
through the spiritualist séances popular at the time (e.g. A.S. Byatt in her 1990 novel 
Possession), but Priest chooses as his entry point a feud between two stage magicians. 
In the novel, this conflict draws on two conceptualisations of magic, either as 
naturalised craft or as actual supernatural power, and the novel itself is similarly built 
on a conflict between naturalised narrative puzzles and fantastical story events. As a 
result, The Prestige has resisted easy categorisations, and has been cited as science 
fiction or fantasy, and as Neo-Victorian metafiction, having won both the mainstream 
James Tait Black Memorial Prize and the World Fantasy Award. 
The novel opens in the present day with a young journalist receiving a copy of 
the diary of his Victorian ancestor, Alfred Borden.5 Borden was a hard-working 
tradesman’s son who taught himself conjuring tricks and eventually made his way to 
the stage under the name “Le Professeur de Magie”. In addition to the story of 
Borden’s life, the diary includes sections where he explains his own attitude towards 
the secrets of his art. “Magic has no mystery to magicians,” Borden believes. “We 
work variations of standard methods. . . . Every illusion can be explained, be it by the 
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use of a concealed compartment, by an adroitly placed mirror, by an assistant planted 
in the audience to act as ‘volunteer’, or by simple misdirection of the audience’s 
attention” (Priest 1995/2004, p. 66). Borden’s most famous stage trick is exactly such 
a naturalisable mystery: in “The Transported Man” he steps into a cupboard on one 
side of the stage, seems to cross the entire width of that space instantaneously and 
step out of another cupboard on the opposite side. The pleasure and thrill of the trick, 
as Borden emphasises in his writings, is in that everyone knows that no magic is 
actually involved, and instead the mystery is created by skilled misdirection. The 
preservation of the mystery itself, however, is crucial, and the extent to which Borden 
is willing to go to maintain it goes to insane lengths. For what the diary slowly reveals 
is that “The Transported Man” is made possible by the fact that Borden is actually a 
pair of twins who, in order to protect the secret of their trick, take turns to live the life 
of a single individual—sharing their wife and children, as well as their mistress, and 
never letting on that they are, in fact, not one man but two. 
Misdirection is also present in the form of Priest’s novel, as the diary performs 
its own narrative trick on readers. Written entirely in the first-person singular—even 
though the two brothers take turns narrating their story—the diary simultaneously 
presents and conceals the solution to its own mystery: 
I write in the year 1901. 
My name, my real name, is Alfred Borden. The story of my life is the story 
of the secrets by which I have lived my life. . . . 
     First let me in a manner of speaking show you my hands, palms forward, 
fingers splayed, and I will say to you (and mark this well): “Every word in 
this notebook that describes my life and work is true, honestly meant and 
accurate in detail.” (Priest, 1995/2004, pp. 31–34) 
 
Just like the audience of stage magic, the readers of Priest’s novel receive this 
announcement of honesty from Borden, and both audiences acquiesce to experiencing 
the mystery that follows. Even the very first word of the diary, “I”, is simultaneously 
a truth and a lie, one that readers are designed to accept at face value at first, but 
whose duplicity is made explicit later on. Borden’s secret remains a secret to his stage 
audiences, but in the diary it is eventually naturalised by the revelation of the twins’ 
unorthodox life and life-writing. This process takes up most of the first half of the 




This effect, however, is offset by the fate of Priest’s second diary-writing 
magician, Rupert Angier. Angier is in some ways Borden’s opposite—the younger 
son of an Earl, he is wealthy and educated—but he does share Borden’s obsessive 
drive to succeed as a magician. The fates of the two men are entangled by an accident 
that sets them in a spiral of competition and revenge, sabotaging each other’s 
performances with tragic consequences. Against Borden’s methodical “Professeur”, 
Angier is the showman—enamoured with the magic act as spectacle. He finds 
Borden’s performances to be impossibly skilful, yet banal in their use of “standard 
stage trickery”. But after trying and failing to produce the uncanny effect of Borden’s 
“Transported Man” by engaging a stage double, Angier decides to match the same 
level of illusion by producing the truly impossible. He obtains from Nicola Tesla an 
electrical machine which transports him from the stage to the back of the theatre 
instantaneously. The trick is a huge success and it establishes Angier’s career as one 
of the greatest magicians of his age. But because his audience expects to be engaging 
with an act of conjuring rather than with reality, Angier now needs to hide an actual 
scientific sensation: that although his trick “by scientific method, in fact achieves the 
hitherto impossible”, he “cannot allow this ever to be known, for science has in this 
case replaced magic” (Priest, 1995/2004, p. 282). Even though the truth of his trick is 
a scientific miracle, Angier strives to maintain the traditional, ‘magical’ audience 
relation. “By careful art”, he has to “make [his] miracle less miraculous” in order to 
have it accepted as magic.  
Tesla’s machine is, of course, an impossiblity in our reality, and its presence 
transforms the historical realism of Priest’s novel into science fiction or steampunk. It 
also ushers in the Gothic and the grotesque. For, strictly speaking, Tesla’s machine 
does not transport anyone anywhere; instead it places a living copy of the person at 
any location chosen. The Angier who steps into the machine is thus copied every 
night he performs the trick, and the inert but living original is each time secreted away 
from the theatre and placed in Angier’s family vault. This goes on until the night 
Borden interferes with the trick, resulting in the “original” Angier remaining mobile 
(though weak) and the new copy gaining only a ghostlike existence. Angier, like 
Borden, becomes two halves of a single man, but in this case neither half is physically 
viable. The original Angier is eventually riddled by cancer and dies, while the copy 
remains mostly insubstantial.  
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Angier’s diary knowingly repeats Borden’s diary illusion, as both the original 
but physically damaged version and the final surviving but incorporeal version of 
Angier use the first-person singular in writing it. The switch between the two occurs 
initially without express signal, but the narrative situation of the diary eventually 
alerts readers by becoming seemingly impossible, with Angier describing his own 
unconsciousness and paralysis and finally even his own death: “At a quarter to three 
this morning my life was brought to its end by a sudden seizure of the heart” (Priest, 
1995/2004, p. 323−325). But unlike Borden’s diary, this time the narrative has 
dropped enough hints about the doubling to make it reasonably easy for readers to 
understand that Angier is writing about the death of his other half. And even those 
readers who are caught by this first-person-for-two-men trick for the second time are 
quickly let off the hook by Angier making explicit reference to Borden’s doubled 
voice: “I have borrowed a technique from Borden, so that I am I as well as myself” 
(Priest, 1995/2004, p. 325).  
Yet, despite the fact that Angier’s narrative situation is naturalised to an 
extent—he turns out not to be an undead man speaking from beyond the grave—the 
fact of his doubling into corporeal and incorporeal versions is itself a deviation from 
the rules of our reality. Thus with Angier, we are no longer able to explain the 
doubled man as a psychologically twisted but ultimately possible set of twins, and 
Priest no longer continues to operate within the naturalist or realist literary tradition. 
The genre of science fiction has been for a long time theorised mainly through its 
presentation of scientifically believable speculation (e.g. Spiegel, 2008)—an approach 
which relies on the assumption that invented technology inherently offers more 
cognitive grounding than the supernatural phenomena typical to fantasy. In The 
Prestige, Priest clearly plays with that assumption by having Angier’s impossible 
magic act be made plausible by a machine invented by a historical person. But even 
the science-fictional naturalisation is only the first step in the process dominating 
Angier’s story. During his career, he was able to fool his theatre audiences into 
continuing to take the fictional attitude towards his performances, but the full, 
grotesque consequences of actual impossibility are represented to the reading 
audience. These are manifested, firstly, by the description of the frame-tale narrator’s 
final descent into the crypt among dozens of immobile but still conscious, rubbery 
Angier copies—undead interstitial beings (see Csicsery-Ronay, 2008, p. 195-198) that 
are all the more horrifying for appearing in a series of absurd poses: 
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The corpses all lay in different positions. Some were straight, others were 
twisted or bent over. None of the bodies was arranged as if lying down; most 
of them had one foot placed in front of the other, so that in being laid on the 
rack this leg was now raised above the other. 
    Every corpse had one foot in the air. . . . 
    I eased myself backwards, not looking. As I reached the main aisle and 
turned slowly around, [I] brushed against the raised foot of the nearest corpse. 
A patent-leather shoe swung slowly to and fro. (Priest, 1995/2004, pp. 354–
357) 
Furthermore, intertextual allusions at the end of the novel usher in the ghosts of both 
Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein and Robert Luis Stevenson’s Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, 
as the final phantom-Angier, re-embodied in one of his own earlier copies, disappears 
off into a blizzard. Thus this novel presents its readers with multiple perspectives to 
the phenomenon of magic—as stage performance, as supernatural power, and as 
fiction. 
The motivation for using stage magic as an analogy for fiction in this 
chapter—and, I believe, in Priest’s novel—is to emphasise the roles of the two aspects 
of fictionality I wanted to focus on: the audience’s expectation of unreality and their 
engagement with the entire act of conjuring, rather than just with the world or the 
actions it seems to represent. It is through the contrast between the two magicians and 
their attitudes, as well as the genre conventions of realism and the fantastic adopted in 
the novel, that Priest expressly signals to his readers the kind of enaction they are 
engaged in. That signalling gesture, like the empty hands of the magician, is designed 
to remind readers to engage with the fiction as fiction, with “a verbal performance in 
which the events depicted never happened, and in which everyone knows they didn’t” 
(Landy, 2012, p. 3). But the central purpose of underlining this role of artificiality in 
fiction is not to undermine the readers’ enactment—on the contrary. For even while 
we are enacting the experiences represented in the fiction, what is also being enacted 
is the work of fiction itself. And what follows from that enaction is not what would 
follow from engagement with reality—a point underlined by the title of Priest’s novel. 
“The prestige” refers, in the vocabulary of stage magic, to the “effect” or the “product 
of magic”, to that which “apparently did not exist before the trick was performed” 
(Priest, 1995/2004, p. 65). Angier’s trick produces copies of himself, whereas Borden 
talks about his whole, bizarre life as the prestige of “The Transported Man” (Priest, 
1995/2004, p. 65). But fiction, I suggest, can also produce in readers its own prestige, 
something that emerges as if by magic from the process of readerly enactment. The 
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prestige of fiction is not a rabbit pulled out of a hat, nor something as grotesque as 
Angiers’ copied bodies; it is a cognitive state of lucid self-delusion in readers, which 
would not be without having been performed through active complicity in a fiction as 





Fictions are interactive cognitive environments that require from readers a 
combination of skills that is much more complex and seemingly self-contradictory 
than the traditional computational cognitive sciences assume. In recent years, 
however, it has become clear also within the cognitive sciences that the use of 
residual common-sense concepts may lead scholars into making oversimplifying 
claims. As Howard Casey Cromwell and Jaak Panksepp (2011) have noted, the 
cognitive and behavioural neurosciences sometimes do fall prey to a form of 
circularity in their attempts to accurately describe the workings of the human brain. 
Citing the NYU neuroscientist Gyorgy Buzsaki they note how the conceptual 
structures created through slow processes of tradition can lead empirical research to 
merely reproduce those structures, to take “a man-created word or concept … and 
search for brain mechanisms that may be responsible for the generation of this 
conceived behaviour” (Cromwell & Panksepp, 2011, 2034). In a similar fashion, the 
risk I see in some of the recent cognitive and empirical studies of fiction is that they 
uncritically adopt apparently universal, common-sense concepts that have received 
added legitimacy from the rational/computational tradition. Such studies may end up 
just confirming the preconceptions of the researchers because of the way the 
conceptualisations guide the set-up of the experiments, in for example the verbal 
instructions or choices provided in questionnaires, or even because they limit the 
vocabulary available for the participants to describe their experiences (see 
Troscianko, 2013, p. 190–191). 
My aim here has therefore been to show how, by focusing on fictionality, 
cognitive literary studies would be better able to analyse those functions and effects 
that arise from the artefactual nature of the text, instead of focusing on just the effects 
that are thought to exist in spite of that artefactuality. Secondly I have tried to suggest 
that the cognitive sciences might benefit from the ideas and analyses presented by 
literary studies concerning the complexities involved in the processing of fictional 
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narratives, and the ways in which that processing is unlike the forms of immersive 
illusion often used as the paradigm cases of literary imaging. While there is already 
much intriguing data relating to our imaginary abilities coming from the empirical 
neurosciences, the results of such studies will be difficult to interpret as long as the 
underlying conceptualisations are still rooted in oversimplifying models. By 
combining the theory of fictionality and the enactive paradigm of perception and 
imagination, the cognitive sciences might be able to further sharpen their own 
conceptual and terminological apparatus and continue to generate fruitful hermeneutic 




1. Other terms in use when discussing the imagination include “make-believe” (e.g. 
Walton, 1990), which is in use in developmental psychology and the anthropology of 
play, and “simulation”, which is seen by many cognitive scientists as an integral part 
of social cognition (e.g. Gallese, Keysers & Rizzolatti, 2004).  
 
2. The Transportation Scale is cited e.g. by Appel & Richter (2007), Bae, Lee & Bae 
(2014), Phillips (2015) and Sanford & Emmott (2012). 
 
3. For a challenge of Noë’s argument concerning sensorimotor knowledge see e.g. 
Hutto & Myin (2013), who argue for a more radical version of contentless cognition. 
 
4. Further work in this tradition includes Wolfgang Iser’s The Fictive and the 
Imaginary (1993) and Paul Ricoeur’s three-level mimesis in Time and Narrative 
(1984-1988). 
 
5.  For an analysis of Christopher Nolan’s film version from 2006, where some 
substantial changes were made to the way the battle between the magicians is 
presented to the audience, see Heilmann (2009/2010). The modern-day frame of the 
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